Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction Cases by Arcaro, Timothy L.
Nova Southeastern University
NSUWorks
Faculty Scholarship Shepard Broad College of Law
2018
Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in
Hague Child Abduction Cases
Timothy L. Arcaro
Nova Southeastern University - Shepard Broad College of Law, arcarot@nova.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Shepard Broad College of Law at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
NSUWorks Citation
Timothy L. Arcaro, Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction Cases, 23 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
237 (2018),
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles/283
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Thu Aug 15 15:03:40 2019
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
Timothy L. Arcaro, Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction
Cases, 23 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 237, 264 (2018).                            
APA 6th ed.                                                                          
Arcaro, T. L. (2018). Think fast: Post judgment considerations in hague child
abduction cases. Suffolk Journal of Trial Appellate Advocacy, 23(2), 237-264.        
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Timothy L. Arcaro, "Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction
Cases," Suffolk Journal of Trial & Appellate Advocacy 23, no. 2 (2018): 237-264      
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Timothy L Arcaro, "Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction
Cases" (2018) 23:2 Suffolk J Trial & Appellate Advoc 237.                            
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Arcaro, Timothy L. "Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction
Cases." Suffolk Journal of Trial & Appellate Advocacy, vol. 23, no. 2, 2018, pp.
237-264. HeinOnline.                                                                 
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Timothy L Arcaro, 'Think Fast: Post Judgment Considerations in Hague Child Abduction
Cases' (2018) 23 SUFFOLK J TRIAL & APP ADVOC 237
Provided by: 
NSU Shepard Broad College of Law Panza Maurer Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device
THINK FAST: POST JUDGMENT
CONSIDERATIONS IN HAGUE CHILD
ABDUCTION CASES
By: Timothy L. Arcaro'
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ ........ 237
II. CONVENTION STRUCTURE ........................................ ........ 238
A. Overview of the Hague Abduction Convention and the International
Child............... ............................ 238
Ill. DUE PROCESS AND POST-JUDGMENT CONSIDERATIONS . ................... 244
A. Due Process ................................ ..... 244
B. Return Orders and Undertaking ........................ 246
C. Post-Trial Motions.. ................................. 249
D. Application for Stay of Enforcement ..................... 251
E. Appeal.................................. .. ..... 255
IV. POST JUDGMENT CUSTODIAL DETERMINATIONS .......................... 258
V. CONCLUSION ................................................ ......... 263
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental aspect of our legal system is that there exists, should
a party wish to take advantage of it, a procedural framework by which a
court's decision-making process may be reviewed for accuracy by higher
tribunals. Litigation under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction2 is no different - a party that does not prevail
in a lower court proceeding may also seek post judgment relief. The
difference is the expeditious nature of Hague Abduction proceedings which
proceed more swiftly through the justice system than almost any other
contested child custody-related matter from initiation of the litigation to
entry of a final order.
In a practical sense, post judgment proceedings in Hague Abduction
cases may offer insignificant remedies where time is of the essence in
resolving international child abduction cases. A party must carefully
consider, prepare for, and plan post judgement strategies both before and
Timothy L. Arcaro is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
College of Law.
2 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Abduction Convention or Convention].
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during the lower court proceedings because the effectiveness of potential
remedies will rest on factors such as timeliness, substantive law, and
economic considerations. Legal remedies may not provide the practical
relief a litigant seeks in the time within which the litigant needs it, given the
speed at which many Hague Convention cases proceed. Although procedural
rules provide the blueprint for post judgment review, they are frequently
subordinated to the Convention mandate of resolving international abduction
cases as expeditiously as possible to limit the harm suffered by child victims.
This article will focus on postjudgment considerations in the context
of federal district court proceedings, which frequently parallel the procedural
aspects of U.S. state court proceedings.3 Part I of this article will examine
the Abduction Convention structure and function to contextualize the
interplay of return cases and post-judgment considerations. Part II will
examine the flexible notions of Due Process and post-trial relief in Hague
proceedings at the federal district court level. Part III will examine post-
judgment access remedies and practical considerations in establishing
custodial rights. In Part IV, I will share my conclusions on post-judgment
relief in the Hague Abduction cases.
II. CONVENTION STRUCTURE
A. Overview of the Hague Abduction Convention and the International
Child
The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the "Hague Convention") is a private international treaty4 that
provides civil remedies to facilitate expedient resolution of international
child abduction cases among member states.' The primary objectives of the
Convention are to promptly return abducted children to their country of
3 See generally Mark R. Kravitz & Erika L. Amarante, Key Diferences Between Civil Appeals
in the Second Circuit and Connecticut's Appellate Courts, 76 CONN. B.J. 149, 150-53 (2002)
(illustrating comparative differences between federal court appellate procedures).
4 "The traditional purpose of the Hague Conference on private international law which is,
according to Article 1 of its statute, to 'woik for the progressive unification of the rules of private
international law.' The reference to "private" law has generally been felt to exclude criminal law
which is normally classified as public law." Preliminary Document No. 1 of November 1992 for
the attention of the Special Commission of January 1993 drawn up by Adair Dyer, First Secretary
at the Permanent Bureau, Introduction 1, Commentary.
See Abduction Convention, supra note 2. See generally Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S.
Ct. 1224, 1228-29 (2014) (addressing purpose of Abduction Convention).
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habitual residence6 and to support and respect access rights'. The
Convention has become a vital tool in combating international parental
abduction even though it provides no criminal sanctions.8 The Convention
was implemented in the United States through the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA") and became effective on July 1, 1988.'
The remedies set forth in ICARA are provide in addition to remedies that
may exist within other laws. o
The Convention requires each contracting state to designate a
Central Authority to discharge the administrative duties imposed by the
Convention." These duties include assisting left-behind parents with access
to Convention remedies, communicating with other Central Authorities,
communicating with national judges on specific cases, and attempting to
amicably resolve cases where possible. 12 Effective communication between
Central Authorities enhances the important task of providing relevant case
developments in a timely manner.' 3 Central Authorities play a critical role in
the overall operation of the Convention given their multiple
6 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(a). These cases will be referred to as
"Return Cases," in which a petitioner is seeking a voluntary return of an abducted child in a member
state or is seeking a compulsory return through compulsion of law.
7 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(b). These cases will be referred to as
"Visitation Cases," in which a petitioner is seeking to orchestrate or enforce rights of access to a
child but not force the child's return. See also Abduction Convention, supra note 2, art. 21.
See generally Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. at 1224 (2014) (applying Abduction Convention
in custody arrangement).
9 See Permanent Bureau, Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction:
United States Country Profile, HCCH 1, 10 (Nov. 2012),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/abduct20l2cp-us.pdf, see also International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (1988) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.S. §§
9001-11 (2018)) (noting ICARA is procedural in nature and provides no additional substantive
remedies beyond those expressly within Convention).
o See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9003(h) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (discussing full faith and
credit judgment pursuant to Convention).
1 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 6 (requiring each contracting state to
establish at least one (1) Central Authority, but "Federal States, States with more than one system
of law or States having autonomous territorial organizations shall be free to appoint more than one
Central Authority and to specify the territorial extend to their powers").
12 See generally Guide to Good Practice, Part I - Central Authority Practice, HAGUE CONF.
ON PRIV. INT'LL. (2003), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/abdguide-e.pdf [hereinafter Guide to Good
Practice, Part 1].
13 See Conclusions and Recommendation of the Inter-American Expert Meeting on
International Child Abduction Co-Organised by the Inter-American Children's Institute and the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, HCCH 1 (Nov. 10, 2006),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/concl-iine.pdf (identifying time periods in communication related
to cases under Convention).
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responsibilities. 14 Importantly, Central Authorities may be able to effectuate
an abducted child's voluntary return without litigation or alternatively assist
a parent with the implementation ofjudicial procedures."
Central Authorities can assist left-behind parents with each of the
two types of cases that technically fall within the Convention's purview:
"return cases" and "access cases." Return cases involve a left-behind parent
seeking to enforce custodial rights by returning an abducted child to the
child's habitual residence. 16 Access cases involve a left-behind parent's
effort to organize or enforce visitation rights between the left-behind parent
and a child taken to a member state. 17 Access remedies are not available in
U.S. Federal courts, but may be presented in state court proceedings where
the child's best interests can be fully explored.18
Importantly, ICARA confers concurrent jurisdiction in Federal court
and U.S. state courts giving the petitioner the choice of forum in return
cases." Federal courts have generally deferred to state court jurisdiction on
access rights set forth in Article 21 given the Domestic Relations Exception
14 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7. A Central Authority may fulfill its
obligations under Article 7h, to take or cause to be taken an action to protect the welfare of children
by:
alerting the appropriate protection agencies or judicial authorities in the requesting State
of the return of a child who may be in danger; advising the requested State, upon request,
of the protective measures and services available in the requesting State to secure the
safe return of a particular child; providing the requested State with a report on the welfare
of the child; encouraging the use of Article 21 of the Convention to secure the effective
exercise of access or visitation rights
See Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference, Report of the Fifth Special Commission Meeting
to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction and the Practical Implementation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect ofParental
Responsibility Measures for the Protection of Children 30 October-9 November 2006, HCCH,
https://assets.hech.net/upload/abduc97e.pdf; see also FED. JUD. CTR., INT'L LITIG. GUIDE 10-11
(2012), https://www.fic.gov/sites/default/files/2012/HagueGuide.pdf [hereinafter FED. JUD. CTR.].
15 See generally Rita Wasserstein Warner, International Child Custody and Abduction Under
the Convention, 23 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 50 (Spring 2010) (explaining administrative assistance
under Convention as potential remedy for voluntary return of children). This remedy would not
require the initiation of legal process but instead the Central Authority would work as the conduit
between the parents in an effort to resolve the case without judicial proceedings. See id.
16 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(a).
17 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(b), art. 21.
8 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 21; Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010)
(stating child's best interests well served when custody decisions are made in habitual residence
states); Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing purpose of
Convention).
19 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9003(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193). For purposes of this
article, I have chosen to focus my analysis on federal court proceedings in return cases.
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and ongoing state court jurisdiction over child custody matters. 20 A prima
facie case for return under the Convention requires the petitioner to establish
that the petitioner had rights of custody that were being exercised 2 1 when
breached by the child's wrongful removal or retention 22 from the child's
habitual residence.2 3 There is a temporal element to each of the factors that
must exist to support a return.24 These elements must be established by a
preponderance of evidence in the U. S. 25 which compels the child's return
"forthwith" unless one of the narrow defenses is applicable.26 The
Convention only applies to children under the age of 16.27 There are limited
defenses to petitions for return, which are set forth in Article 1228, Article
20 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (holding right to control and possess belongs
to state laws and not laws of United States).
21 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3(a); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 20.
22 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3; FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 20.
23 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4; FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 20.
24 See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A Hague Convention case
asks the following questions in this order: (1) When did the removal or retention of the child occur?
(2) In what State was the child habitually resident immediately prior to the removal or retention?
(3) Was the removal or retention in breach of the custody rights of the petitioning parent under the
law of the State of the child's habitual residence? and (4) Was the petitioning parent exercising
those rights at the time of the unlawful removal or retention?"); see also Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk,
445 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir.2001)
(same).
25 See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(A) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193).
26 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9001(a)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) ("Children who are
wrongfully removed or retained ... are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions
set forth in the Convention applies.").
27 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4.
28 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12. Article 12 states,
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the
date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative
authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has
elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall
order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even
where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one
year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless
it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.
Id.
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1329, and Article 2030 of the Convention." The most utilized defense in return
cases is Article 13(b) which is also referred to as the "grave risk of harm
defense" and must be established by clear and convincing evidence.3 2 Courts
have made clear that Convention defenses are the exception and not the rule
when it. comes to granting return petitions.33 Convention defenses were
intentionally drafted to have narrow application in return cases.34 When a
defense is established, the court's duty to return the child to the state of
29 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13. Article 13 of the Convention states the
following:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that - a) the person,
institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually
exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal of retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his
or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place
the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned
and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account
of its views.
Id.
30 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12 (dealing with judicial or administrative
authority). The child's return under the provision of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. See id.
31 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996) ("All four of these exceptions
are 'narrow . . . ."'); ELISA PtREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD
ABDUCTION CONVENTION ¶ 34 (1982), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf ("[The
exceptions] are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead
letter."); see also id. at T 116 ("it cannot be inferred ... that the exceptions are to receive a wide
interpretation.") [hereinafter PtREZ-VERA REPORT].
32 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) ("In the case of an
action for the return of a child, a respondent who opposes the return of the child has the burden of
establishing- by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in Article 13b
or 20 of the Convention applies. . . ."); see also Kevin O'Gorman & Efren C. Olivares, The Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: An Update After Abbott, 33
HouS. J. INT'L. L. 39, 46 (2010) (establishing burdens of proof in Hague cases under ICARA); 22
U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(A) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (stating burden for return petition is
preponderance of evidence regardless of filing in other court).
33 See Krefter v. Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135 (D. Mass. 2009) ("[T]he bar for proving the
grave risk' exception is set exceptionally high."); Hague International Child Abduction
Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10, 491-501 (Mar. 26, 1986) ("[T]he person opposing the child's return
must show that the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious.").
34 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 9001(a)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) ("Children who are
wrongfully removed or retained. . . are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions
set forth in the Convention applies.").
242
THINK FAST
habitual residence shifts from one that is mandatory to one that is
discretionary.3 5
The Convention calls for expedited resolution of child abduction
cases within a suggested six-week timeframe from the initiation of legal
process.36 Abduction cases filed under the Convention are generally given
priority on court dockets by administrative order in compliance with the
dictates of ICARA and the Convention goals." The expedient nature of
Convention judicial proceedings is designed to help ameliorate the harms of
international child abduction by quickly returning abducted children to their
habitual residence.38 The Convention only addresses the remedy of return; it
does not mandate or require a change of custody as a condition precedent to
the child's return, nor does it require a change of custody upon the child's
actual return.3 9 As a result, return orders under the Convention generally
direct a child's return to the child's country of habitual residence and not
necessarily to a specific parent.40 The Convention flatly prohibits member
states from making return decisions based on the merits of substantive
custodial disputes.4 1 The United States has provided similar provisions in
ICARA.4 2 The Convention authorizes tribunals to resolve only the limited
issues related to return petitions, including the merits of wrongful removal
or retention claims while excluding a best interest custodial analysis for the
" See Gsponer v. Johnstone, 12 Fan LR 755, 765 (Family Court of Australia 1988) (holding
return of child to Switzerland under Convention); PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, T 113
(emphasizing judges retain discretion to return children even when enumerated exception may
apply).
36 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11.
11 See March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir. 2001) (ruling courts to place cases on "fast
track" to expedite proceedings and execute purposes of Convention).
38 See PtREz-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, ¶ 23 (emphasizing importance of considering
interests of the child).
3 See 22 U.S.C.S, § 9001(b)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-173) (restricting courts from
making decisions on merits of child custody issues); see also Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1128
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining purpose of the Hague Convention); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844,
847 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing Hague Convention's role); PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31,¶ 16 (explaining importance of returning children to preserve status quo in custody disputes).
40 See Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912,917 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing Convention returns
child back to their habitual residence).
41 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 16 (explaining process after receiving notice
of wrongful removal or retention of child). "[T]he judicial or administrative authorities of the
Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not
decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be
returned under this Convention. . .." Id. See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 19 ("A
decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a
determination on the merits of any custody issue.").
42 See 22 U.S.C.S, § 9001(b)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-173) ("[T]he Convention
and this Act empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.").
2018] 243
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subject child.43 The Convention operates on the premise that each member
state exercises sovereign authority to enter custodial orders to protect the
children that come before tribunals." Courts should respect the right of each
member state to resolve underlying child custody disputes that arise within
their own territorial boundaries pursuant to their own respective cultural and
legal norms.4 5 Recognition and respect for the autonomous right of each
member state to resolve such disputes helps deter forum shopping while
reinforcing the mutual and collective benefits of Convention membership. 46
HI. DUE PROCESS AND POST-JUDGMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Due Process
The Hague Abduction Convention does not provide a procedural
framework for resolution of Convention cases. Instead, member states are to
utilize the most expeditious procedures to bring about prompt return of
internationally-abducted children.4 7 When a return petition is filed under the
Convention in U.S. federal district court, there are few, if any, procedural
barriers that prevent the petition from being immediately set for a final
hearing or summarily granted.48 In the U.S., courts are left with substantial
43 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (limiting Hague Convention from considering
the merits ofcustody); see also In re Morris, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (D. Colo. 1999) (recognizing
"[p]ursuant to Article 19 of the Convention, [this Court has] no power to pass on the merits of
custody."); Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991) (noting courts review
merits of abduction, not custody).
4 See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting states' deference to
child's home forum). "In the exercise of comity that is at the heart of the Convention..., we are
required to place our trust in the court of the home country to issue whatever orders may be
necessary to safeguard children who come before it." Id.
45 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) (analyzing principles
"inherent in the Convention and the Act). "[T]he Hague Convention is generally intended to restore
the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from crossing borders in search of a more
sympathetic court." Id.; see also PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, T 16 (explaining importance
of returning children to preserve status quo in custody disputes.)
46 See Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining purpose of
Convention). The Convention is designed to deter "those close to [a child], such as parents,
guardians, or family members" from unilaterally taking or keeping the child out of the country of
habitual residence with an intent "to establish artificial jurisdictional links" to a more sympathetic
forum for a custody dispute. Id.
4 See generally Abduction Convention, supra note 2 (outlining expeditious procedures for
returning children).
48 See Menechem v. Frydman-Menachem, 240 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (D. Md. 2003)
(emphasizing the Convention calls for an expeditious court process). Given the unique nature of
the Abduction Convention, "neither the Convention nor ICARA, nor any other law of which we
are aware including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, requires 'that discovery be
allowed or that an evidentiary hearing be conducted' as a matter of right in cases arising under the
244
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discretion in determining the procedures necessary to resolve abduction
cases. 49 That discretion includes structuring the procedural aspects of
abduction litigation in a way that balances the litigant's rights with the
demand for expeditious resolution under ICARA.so It may also include
dispensing with traditional notions of due process protections, including pre-
trial discovery or even an evidentiary hearing.5 I To be clear, this does not
mean that all Hague Abduction proceedings are quickly resolved at the trial
court level. Many of the reported appellate decisions from U.S. courts reflect
extensive trial court proceedings in which the trial court took significant
measures to ensure a full evidentiary hearing was conducted in order to
explore the factual circumstances of the issues presented. 52 While the due
process hallmarks of "notice and opportunity to be heard" are still in play,
every indication should be that these cases will be resolved faster rather than
slower.5 ' The practitioner's traditional arsenal of procedural protections in
the form of civil procedure rules may be completely useless in this context.54
The Convention sets forth a short time frame for resolution of
judicial proceedings, but neither the Convention nor ICARA provides any
direct guidance on post-judgment procedures nor any applicable time frames
for resolution of post-judgment remedies. With no international mandate,
each member state utilizes its own domestic law in determining how to best
comply with Convention directives.5 ' There may be a gap in time between
Convention." West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting March v. Levine, 249
F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir. 2001)).
49 See Dobrev, 735 F.3d at 929 (explaining courts should use the "most expeditious procedures
available" in return proceedings).
50 See Menechem, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (evidencing balance between litigant's rights and
speedy resolution).
5 See id. (emphasizing court may omit pre-trial discovery and evidentiary hearings in order
for quick resolution).
52 See e.g., Kreffer v. Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125, 127 (noting court held four days of
evidentiary hearings over four-month period of time); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060,
1070 (noting importance of using evidentiary hearings).
53 See Egervary v. Rooney, 80 F. Supp. 2d 491 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (refusing to enforce ex parte
order where respondent had not been served and had no actual notice).
54 See Menechem, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (rejecting Petitioner's argument that evidentiary
hearings are required). Because of the Convention's interest in "prompt action," the Court decided:
that when, as here, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that the
case is ripe for decision as a matter of law, summary judgment is the appropriate vehicle
for deciding the case in a prompt and expeditious manner, consistent with the purposes
of the Convention.
Id.
ss See NIGEL LOWE & SARAH ARMSTRONG, NAT'L CTR. MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD.,
Good Practice in Handling Hague Abduction Convention Return Applications, pg. 7 (2002),
https://www.icmec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Good-Practice-in-Handling-Hague-
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expeditious judicial proceedings at the trial court level and lengthy appellate
court proceedings which creates a number of strategic and substantive post-
judgment considerations for the practitioner and the client. 56 This is
especially true where a court orders a child's immediate and permanent
return to the child's country of habitual residence, as the child may be
physically removed from the court's jurisdiction within a very short period
of time-literally hours or days from the entry of the return order. Once a
child is physically returned to his country of habitual residence on a return
order, post-judgment remedies are not legally moot, but they may not be
practical with regard to enforcing the return of a child repatriated to a foreign
country.5 7
B. Return Orders and Undertakings
Once a U.S. court rules on a return petition, the child's return will
either be ordered or it will be denied; there is very little room for a
compromise position." This may explain why the use of mediation to resolve
Convention cases has not been widely adopted in most jurisdictions.59 When
a petition for return is not granted in a U.S. court, the child will be permitted
to remain in the U. S, pending the next phase of the case which might include
appellate proceedings or state court proceedings to address access rights.60
Return orders frequently address the necessary details surrounding the
child's repatriation, leaving only the matter of implementation of the court's
order to take place.
Abduction-Convention-Return-Applications.pdf (recognizing that member states use their own
domestic law when addressing Convention instructions).
56 See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 183-85 (2013) (Ginsburg. J., dissenting) (exemplifying
scenario where court system was not expeditious). Justice Ginsburg noted that the inconsistency
of the over two-year litigation involving the parties' minor child and the Convention, was a
"protraction so marked is hardly consonant with the Convention's objectives." Id. at 183-85.
" Seeild. at 166-67 (enforcing return order to habitual residence does not moot appeal pending
in federal district court).
58 See generally Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
grant of Child Return Petition filed by plaintiff); de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1288 (10th Cir.
2007) (denying petition for return of child).
5 Jennifer Zawid, Symposium Article: Practical and Ethical Implications of Mediating
International Child Abduction Cases: A New Frontier for Mediators, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 1, 11, 17 (2008) (describing mediation as an uncommon way of resolving international child
abduction cases). While a national conference was held in 2008 to create an International Child
Abduction Mediation program in the United States, "mediation has not been widely utilized in
international child abduction cases." Id. at 11.
6 See infra Part III (addressing state remedies available to orchestrate contact and access to
state custodial laws).
61 See Kufher v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2008) (providing detailed final order for
conditions of return).
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The broad language of the Convention and ICARA, in conjunction
with U.S. procedural and substantive law, has been interpreted by U.S. courts
to provide a variety of prophylactic measures to protect children from further
harm in abduction cases including emergency injunctive relief62, temporary
timeshare orders63 , psychological evaluations, along with other measures to
safeguard vulnerable children.' Some children face identifiable and
particularized threats of harm associated with their return. Courts have clear
authority to exhaust all reasonable measures to protect children during the
litigation and to reduce risks associated with a child's return even where a
grave risk of harm defense is asserted and established.6 1 Courts have the
ability to fashion protective conditions known as "undertakings" which are
conditions put into place between the parties to ensure the safe return of a
child.' Undertakings are not mandatory but must be taken into account to
facilitate a child's safe return. 67 They may include a variety of conditions
surrounding return orders including transportation details, visitation
restrictions, and psychological services.6 There is no authority within the
62 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9004(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (outlining authority of
courts in international child abduction cases). ICARA provides similar language in furtherance of
the objects of the Convention permitting courts to "protect the well-being of the child involved or
to prevent the child's further removal or concealment before the final disposition of the petition."
Id.
63 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9004(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (authorizing physical
removal of a child where substantive state law requirements have been met).
6 See generally Culculoglu v. Culculoglu, No. 2:13-cv-00446-GMN-CWH, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48842, at *2, *13 (D. Nev. 2013) (granting injunctive relief for petitioner's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order). The order sought to keep children in place until the resolution of
the Wrongful Retention case on the merits. Id. at *2. See also Etienne v. Zuniga, No. C1O-
5061BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36857, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (granting ex-parte motion for
U.S. Marshal Service to receive children's passports, visas, and travel documents); Roszkowski v.
Roszkowska, 644 A.2d 1150, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (requiring defendant to bear
costs associated with return of child and for psychological evaluations).
65 See Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 972-74 (Conn. 2000) (reiterating need to protect
children during litigation). The court went on to specifically identify the type of protections that
would be necessary to return the children which included: the mother retaining custody of the child,
an appropriate third party in the home country could care for the child, or the home country could
enforce conditions of a return order. Id. at 972. Even where Article 13b was established, the child
should be returned where the harm can be mitigated. Id. at 972-74
66 See Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 303-04 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining undertakings);
see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining how to apply
undertakings), affig 386 F.3d 289 (1St Cir. 2004). The use of undertakings must be narrow in scope,
and "must focus on the particular situation of the child" and on whether some set of requirements
"will suffice to protect the child." Id.
67 See generally Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty:
Gender Politics and Other Issues, 33 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (2001) (explaining the use and
function of undertakings).
68 See generally Roxanne Hoegger, What if she leaves? Domestic Violence Under the Hague
Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELY WOMEN'S L.J. 181,
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Convention or any other body of international law to compel any other
member state to comply with undertakings.69 If undertakings cannot protect
a child, the court has the discretion to refuse a return order.70 Undertakings
are frequently used to facilitate returns associated with grave risk of harm to
the child." Undertakings to do not include the authority of a court to dictate
terms and conditions of post-return supervision.7 2 Failure to comply with a
court ordered undertakings may result in contempt proceedings and may also
result in the child not being returned.73 Undertakings play an important role
in the practical details of repatriating abducted children under the
Convention. 74
U.S. federal and state court jurisdiction will end where a return order
is implemented and a child is physically returned to their country of habitual
residence.7 5 Every return order carries the implied, if not expressed, finding
182-84 (2003),
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context-bglj (discussing
shortcomings associated with Undertaking conditions); Peter Glass, Blondin v. Dubois Hagois: A
closer Step to Safeguarding the Welfare ofAbducted Children?, 26 BROOK J. INT'L L. 723, 724-28
(2000) (analyzing Blondin v. Dubois cases I and II).
'9 See Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 970-72 (Conn. 2000) (discussing benefits of requiring
compliance to the Hague Convention); see also Kyle Simpson, What Constitutes a "Grave Risk of
Harm? ": Lowering the Hague Child Abduction Convention's Article 13(b) Evidentiary Burden to
Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 841, 843-45 (2017) (explaining
weakness of undertakings in context of domestic violence cases and 13(b) defenses under
Convention).
70 See Feder v. Evan-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995) (detailing courts' discretion to
refuse return order).
71 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing how undertakings can
mitigate a "grave risk of harm"); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging "grave risk of harm" factor in return of children); Sabogal v. Velarde, 106 F. Supp.
3d 689, 708-09 (D. Md. 2015) (describing undertakings and the ways in which they can "preserve
[a] child's safety").
72 See Kufner v. Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d 491, 514 (D.R.I. 2007) (citing. McLarey, 286 F.3d at
22 (1st Cir. 2002)) (explaining undertakings as safeguard). "The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit analyzed the use of undertakings from the perspective of international comity and concluded
that undertakings which '[c]ondition[ ] a return order on a foreign court's entry of an order' likely
offend notions of comity because they would "smack of coercion of the foreign court." Id. See also
PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, ¶ 120 ("the return of a child cannot be made conditional upon
[a] decision or other determination being provided [by the court of the country of habitual
residence].")
" See Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 514-16 (violating undertakings can result in contempt of
court).
74 See William M. Hilton, The Limitations on Article 13(b) ofthe Convention on Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, 11 A.M. J. FAM. L. 139, 142 (1997) ("An 'undertaking' is an
agreement/stipulation between the parties on the specific issue of the logistics of returning a child
to his or her 'habitual residence."').
7 See Jeanine Lewis, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction; When Domestic Violence and Child abuse Impact the Goal of Comity, 13 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 427-28 (2000) (noting once Convention goal of return is effectuated, no
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that the child's habitual residence is better situated to resolve the underlying
child custody dispute regarding that child. 6 The return of the child to his
state of habitual residence marks the end of the case as far as a U.S. court's
jurisdiction to enter substantive relief over the child. The child's country of
habitual residence will now have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
underlying custodial dispute and organize the litigant's rights of custody and
access pursuant to the domestic law of that forum state.77 As such, it would
be unlawful and inconsistent for a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a
child that has been returned given the Uniform Child Custody and
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act's (UCCJEA) jurisdictional mandates.
C. Post-Trial Motions
Hague Abduction cases may lawfully be resolved summarily
without a full evidentiary hearing, a process that seems incompatible with
U.S. notions of Due Process and fair play. However, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure clearly provide an avenue for procedural relief if only from
a statutory perspective.7 ' As an academic matter, any party may request post-
trial relief in federal court proceedings once the court enters a final order. 8
ongoing jurisdiction under Convention). Additionally, there is no other systemic measure to follow-
up on the status of children once returned to their country of habitual residence. Id.
76 See generally Loos v. Manuel, 651 A.2d 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (noting court's
role is not to make traditional custody decisions). The court must determine in what jurisdiction
such decisions should properly be made and order the physical return of the child to that location
where jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under domestic law. Id.
7 See PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, ¶ 19 (marking end of U.S. Courts' jurisdiction
when back to habitual residence). "[T]he Convention rests implicitly upon the principle that any
debate on the merits of the question, i.e., of custody rights, should take place before the competent
authorities in the State where the child had its habitual residence prior to its removal." Id.
7 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2 (explaining jurisdictional bases that exist
under UCCJEA compared to predecessor Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA));
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997) (attempting
to alleviate inconsistencies between states' varying interpretations of prior versions of the act).
7 See FED. R Civ. P. 59(a)(2) (explaining motion for rehearing filed under F.R.C.P. 59 is
same as motion for new trial). According to the rule, "[a]fter a nonjury trial, the court may, on
motion for a new trial, open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment."
Id. See generally Claybrook Drilling Co. v. Divanco, Inc., 336 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1964)
(recognizing service for motion of new trial effective upon mailing); Slater v. Peyser, 200 F.2d 360,
361 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (holding agreement with opposing counsel does not negate ten-day
requirement); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (holding
appellant must file for rehearing within ten days).
s0 See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. (providing rules for post-trial motions). Pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, post-trial relief may include a motion filed under Rule 59 labeled "New
Trial: Altering or Amending a Judgment" or possibly Rule 60 labeled "Relief From Judgment." See
id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 60. On its surface each rule appears to provide a foundation for post-trial relief,
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As a practical matter, post-trial relief will necessarily be narrowly construed
in Hague cases given the impetus to expedite a final resolution and the
court's substantial discretion in fashioning concomitant procedures.8 1
Although FRCP 59(b) provides up to 28 days to file a motion for a new trial,
the child may already be repatriated to his habitual residence on a return
order before the motion is even filed.8 2
When a return order is entered by a U.S. court, the abducting parent
must decide if they will live with the consequences of the court's return
order, or alternatively pursue post-judgment relief. Utilizing post-judgment
remedies solely as a tactic to delay a child's return is unethical and should
be met with sanctions by the court. 83 Aside from strategic implications, there
will also be economic considerations in return cases given ICARA's
mandate of a compulsory award of attorney's fees and costs to the petitioner
when an order of return is granted.84 The respondent will face the daunting
proposition of paying not only their attorney fees, but also the petitioner's
fees for both trial and unsuccessful post-judgment litigation.85  A party's
ability to afford representation in post-judgment proceedings is a critical
factor in determining whether the case ends at final judgment or moves
forward.
but the case law does not support any significant procedural relief in Hague Abduction litigation.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 59; FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
" Menechem v. Frydman-Menechem, 240 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (D. Md. 2003) (explaining
importance of expediency in stay proceedings). Given the unique nature of the Abduction
Convention, "neither the Convention or ICARA, nor any other law of which we are aware including
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, requires 'that discovery be allowed or that an
evidentiary hearing be conducted' as a matter of right in cases arising under the Convention." West
v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir.
2001)).
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (providing time guidelines for filing motion for new trial).
Pursuant to Rule 59(b), "[a] motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of judgment." Id. Note that a motion filed under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a litigant may seek to be relieved from judgment within a "reasonable time," but "no
more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." See FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). However, the movant will run into the same practical problem of the child's
return taking precedence over the procedural posture of the case. Id.
83 See Cuellar v. Joyce, 603 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting Court will not encourage
improper delaying tactics by abducting parents). The Cuellar court was of the opinion that if the
party did not want to bear fees, he should not have engaged in manipulative tactics; thus the court
declined to encourage these acts by abducting parents. Id.
84 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9007(b)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (citing 22 U.S.C.S. §
9003) (compelling Respondent to pay attorney fees for Petitioner when return petitions granted).
Relief also includes the following: "legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of
proceedings in the action, and transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the
respondent establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate." Id.
85 See Ovalle v. Perez, 0:16-cv-62134-BB, unreported, on file with the author (compelling
payment of all post-judgement fees including appellate expenses incurred by Respondent).
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D. Application for Stay of Enforcement
A stay order suspends enforcement of an order or judgment while
the appellate court assesses the legality of the order on appeal.86 A stay
pending appeal is not a matter of right, but rather discretionary relief
potentially available in Hague Abduction cases where an injury resulting
from a return order is actual and imminent as opposed to remote or
speculative harm." The party seeking a stay must establish the legal
predicate for granting of such relief." The district court may stay
proceedings to enforce a judgment until after it has ruled on post-judgment
motions. 9
Return orders under the Convention are designed to immediately
return abducted children to their habitual residence. Parents that plan to
appeal a return order must consider a stay to the enforcement of a return
order to prevent the child's physical return to their country of habitual
residence even though stays are generally disfavored and should be of short
duration.90 An order staying the child's return will be an exception rather
than the rule given the resulting delay to a return order.91 The request must
be filed with the trial court before accessing appellate review in order to give
the trial court an opportunity to correct the complained-of errors.92 If the
motion is granted by the trial court, then enforcement of the order is stayed
pending the terms set forth in the court's order to stay enforcement. If no
stay of enforcement of the return order is entered, the child will be returned
immediately pursuant to the terms of the final judgment unless the movant
86 See Dorothy Easley, Appellate Stays in Civil Cases: Florida and Federal Courts Offer More
Security Flexibility Than Believed, But Stay Violations Still have Teeth, 86 FLA. B.J. 10, 48 (Dec.
2012),
http://www3.flabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/cOd73 1e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/2e
129f3b5fd9aea085257ac300506870!OpenDocument&Highlight-O,*(explaining general function
of stays and strategic use of alternative security in stay proceedings).
87 See generally United States v. Apple Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 263, 278-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(explaining standard in evaluating stay applicant including irreparable injury); M.S.P.C. v. U.S.
Customs & Boarder Protections, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. N. M. 2014) (stating stay not
absolute right; therefore, party seeking stay must establish jurisdiction).
88 See generally Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 577-78 (D.S.C. 2014) (reinforcing party
seeking stay bears burden of establishing exacting standards).
89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b) (establishing appropriate terms for stays pending deposition of
motion).
9 See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 183 (2013) ("[S]tays, even of short duration, should not
be granted 'as a matter of course,' for they inevitably entail loss of 'precious months when [the
child] could have been readjusting to life in her country of habitual residence.').
91 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) (staying an order).
92 See Didon v. Castillo, 838 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2016) (filing motion for stay of District
Court's judgment denying order before filing appeal).
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seeks a stay from the federal district court of appeal.93 Federal courts of
appeal use the same legal criteria as the trial court in determining the
issuance of a stay order.94 Entry of a stay order may be critically important
depending on the child's country of habitual residence. If the appellant
prevails on appeal, it may be dramatically easier to have the child returned
to the U.S. from a member state that is compliant with its treaty obligations
as opposed to a member state that is non-compliant with its treaty
obligations."
The cardinal rule of stay applications is that the party seeking the
stay of the federal district court's order must ordinarily pursue that relief first
by filing a motion for stay directly with the lower court.96 If the district court
denies the stay, the proper procedure is to then file a motion for stay directly
with the circuit court of appeals." In Haimdas v. Haimdas, the reviewing
court specifically recognized the helpfulness of the trial court procedure to
grant a brief stay for purpose of seeking appellate court review of a Hague
return order." Even if the District Court is not inclined to stay the child's
93 See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 173 (explaining standard for Federal Courts of Appeal in issuing
stay order).
94 See id. (noting Federal Court standard same as Trial Court for issuing stay order).
95 For example, England is identified by the U.S. State Department in its 2015 country report
as compliant with its treaty obligations. Compliant means the country has judicial procedures to
promptly facilitate requests for relief under the convention. Conversely, Guatemala is identified as
non-compliant with its obligations, meaning it fails to comply with its treaty obligations. There
should be little faith that a non-compliant country would return a child to the U.S. by compulsion
of a U.S. court order where the country has failed to comply with its treaty obligations. This factor
alone should carry more weight with a reviewing court when a stay is requested. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 29-32 (2015),
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWIPCAAssets/pdfs/AnnualReports/2015%2OAnnual%20
Report.pdf.
96 See FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1) (providing party seeking stay must first seek relief from District
Court). This is the case unless seeking this relief is otherwise impractical. Id. See also Baker v.
Adams Cty./Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating cardinal rule of stay
applications); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 341 (7th Cir. 2015) (challenging
jurisdiction); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dunlap, 253 F.3d 768, 774 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating cardinal rule of stay application).
9 See FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2) (listing requirements for motion to court of appeals). See
generally Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc. 782 F.2d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding appeal of
district court's denial of stay not final decision). The Shiley court also held that an appeal of the
district court's "denial of a stay of post-trial injunction pending an appeal on the merits is neither a
'final decision'. . . nor within this court's jurisdiction over interlocutory orders as delineated in 28
U.S.C. § 1292(c)." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.S §1292(c) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193)
(outlining where the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction)..
98 See Haimdas v. Haimdas, 720 F. Supp. 2d 183, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding brief stay is
in order). Respondent may make a request to the Second Circuit Court of Appels for an emergency
stay and expedited treatment of his appeal. Id. See also Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 138 (2d
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return, the brief stay for appellate review preserves the status quo while
simultaneously affording the appellant the opportunity to seek a stay from
the reviewing court." In the oft-quoted passage from the Sixth Circuit:
"Staying the return of a child in an action under the Convention should
hardly be a matter of course. The aim of the Convention is to secure prompt
return of the child to the correct jurisdiction, and any unnecessary delay
renders the subsequent return more difficult for the child, and subsequent
adjudication more difficult for the foreign court."100
The same legal factors and case law to support the issuance of a stay
apply regardless of whether the stay is sought at the district court or appellate
court level.'01 If the appellate court issues a stay, that order will set forth the
details for suspension of enforcement of the trial court order. 102 Unless a stay
is issued by the district court, taking an appeal of the district court's final
order alone will not suspend the enforcement of the district court's order. 103
A party trying to prevent enforcement of the return order must obtain the
discretionary relief provided through a stay pending appeal. A stay may also
provide an opportunity to organize undertakings to support return.
Cir. 2001) (noting district court's grant of Hague Convention petition "helpfully stayed its order"
of return). This was for a period of two days to permit respondent to seek a stay pending appeal
from the Court of Appeals. Id.
99 See Diorinou, 237 F.3d at 138 (maintaining status quo with holding).
100 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) (staying order).
101 While some Courts of Appeals will defer to the district court's determination and will reach
a differing conclusion only if the district court abused its discretion, or if there were changed
circumstances after the district court's order, other courts have reasoned that Civil Rule 62 and
Appellate Rule 8 should use the same test. Otherwise, it would not make sense to require the movant
to apply first to the district court. See 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3954 (4th ed. 2015)
(explaining Motion for Stay or Injunction). "Thus, motions made in the court of appeals may be
resolved by reference to the case law concerning Civil Rule 62" (which applies to requests made
to the district court.). Id.
102 See FED. R. APP. P. 8(a) (explaining stay issued by appellate court suspends district court
order). "While the power of a court of appeals to stay proceedings in the district court during the
pendency of an appeal is not explicitly conferred by statute, it exists by virtue of the all writs statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1651.... And the Supreme Court has termed the power 'inherent' and 'part of its (the
court of appeals) traditional equipment for the administration of justice."' FED. R. APP. P. 8
advisory committee's notes.
103 See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. F.T.C., 647 F.2d 1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (appealing
district court's ruling without more will not suspend order). According to the court,
[u]nless a stay is granted either by the court rendering the judgment or by the court to
which the appeal is taken, the judgment remains operative. To be sure, for as long as the
appellate court retains its mandate it maintains its jurisdiction over the case, and thus the
power to alter the mandate. But non-issuance of the mandate by the appellate court has
no impact on the trial court's powers to enforce its unstayed judgment since the latter
court has retained that power throughout the pendency of the appeal.
Id.
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In determining whether to grant a stay in a return case ordered
pursuant to ICARA, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chafin v. Chafin directed
that four traditional stay factors must be met: (1) whether the stay is applicant
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of a stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. 10 4 Even absent a showing
of a likelihood of success on the merits, a stay may be granted if the other
remaining factors ("the equities") strongly favor the movant.10 These factors
should be evaluated on a sliding scale such that a stronger showing on one
element should excuse a lesser showing on other elements. 106 A stay order
may prevent litigation to re-return a child if appellant prevails on appeal, but
that factor alone is not sufficient to justify a stay.10 7 Orders staying the
enforcement of a return order under ICARA are conceptually incompatible
with the clear dictates of both the Convention and ICARA." As such, a
party seeking to stay a return order should expect close judicial scrutiny of
each stay-factor in the context of the Convention's goal expeditious
proceedings to promptly return victims of international child abduction.
A stay application and an appeal will necessarily go hand-in-hand.
Unless a party challenging a return order plans to appeal the district court's
determination, a stay application will have limited utility. The same holds
true for appellate court review: if the party challenging the return order is not
moving forward with an appeal, there would be almost no basis for the
appellate court to grant the stay. The motion for stay and notice of appeal are
in lock-step and should be considered as part of the same process to obtain
post-trial relief. While a stay is not a prerequisite to pursue appellate court
relief, the district court will otherwise enforce its order and return the child
during the appellate court process. Where no stay is entered pending appeal,
the petitioner will be able to remove the child and return the child to the
child's habitual residence consistent with the return order. If the appellant
104 See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 176-80 (2013) (explaining factors that must be met for
stay order); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing issue
of stay) See also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (applying same factors in habeas
proceedings as civil stay proceedings).
105 See Antonio v. Bello, No. 04-12794-GG, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18334, at *1-3 (11th Cir.
June 10, 2004) (reiterating stay may be allowed if the remaining three factors are strongly present);
Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-1 1424-D, 2000 WL 381901, at *9 (11th Cir. Apr. 19,
2000) (explaining movant need only show denial of stay would cause "substantial harm to non-
movant").
106 See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c) (providing equities that must be balanced and considered).
107 See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting impossibility of
providing relief to prevailing party when case becomes moot).
.os See Chafin, 568 U.S. at 165 (noting difference between ICARA and Convention).
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should ultimately prevail on appeal, there may be a significant challenge in
retrieving a returned child especially from countries that have demonstrated
patterns of non-compliance with their Convention obligations.10 9
E. Appeal
For most aggrieved parties in Hague Abduction litigation, one of the
most important decisions is whether to appeal an adverse final order. The
appellate remedy clock begins to tick as soon at the U.S. district court enters
the final order, absent the filing of a motion for rehearing."o The district
court must enter a final order to trigger potential remedies that may be
available through appellate proceedings. As a matter of technical
significance, a judgment is set forth "on a separate document" and entered
on the court's docket pursuant to FRCP 79(a). All time periods relevant to
the appeal process begin to run when the clerk completes the task of creating
a separate document and enters it into the docket.i"' The timely filing of the
notice of appeal is critically important to properly invoke appellate court
jurisdiction.112 While federal rules provide a limited basis to extend the
period to take an appeal, the expeditious nature of Hague cases suggest delay
in judicial proceedings are generally harmful to children and should be
avoided.113 The obligation to expedite proceedings in Hague Abduction
litigation extends to the appellate process as well.114
109 Each year the Department of State, Office of Children's Issues is required to submit to
Congress a report on U.S. treaty partner's compliance with Convention. Importantly, the report
identifies the Department's concerns regarding countries where the implementation of the
Convention is incomplete or in which a particular country's executive, judicial, or law enforcement
authorities do not properly apply the Convention. See U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 33
(2016),
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWIPCAAssets/pdfs/AnnualReports/2016%2OAnnual%20
Report.pdf.
110 See Guide to Good Practice, Part I, supra note 12, at 19 (explaining authorities of
Convention signatories). Each signatory to the Convention has the authority to create its own
procedural regulations to review orders entered on Hague petitions. Id. at 19-20. It therefore rests
with each Contracting State to ensure that appeals proceed with dispatch. Id. at 20.
.. See FED. R. CIv. P. 58 (governing how judgments shall be entered).
112 See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960) (holding timely filing ofa notice
of appeal is "jurisdictional").
113 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5); 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) (providing expiration of time for motions and
exceptions for filing of appeals).
114 See Guide to Good Practice, Part I, supra note 12, at 19 ("Expeditious procedures are
essential at all stages of the Convention process"). See also Guide to Good Practice, Part IV -
Enforcement, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT'L L. § 2.2 (2010) [hereinafter Guide to Good Practice,
Part IVJ (explaining no timeline for review of first-instance decisions). While "[the] obligation to
process return applications expeditiously ... extends to appeal procedures," the Convention does
not prescribe modes of, or time frames for, appellate review of first instance decisions. Id. at 13.
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Unlike the express language of the Abduction Convention, which
sets forth a six-week expedited timeframe for resolution of petitions for relief
under the Abduction Convention, there is no corresponding expedited time
frame set forth when appeals are taken of final orders.115 Even without an
express mandate to do so, many Federal and state courts have adopted
expedited procedures for handling return-order cases.116 The appeal will
surely take both time and money whether it is truly expedited or not.
The U.S. District Court of Appeal has authority to reverse a trial
court's order of return and issue a re-return order to the U.S. which is a
plausible outcome sufficient to preserve jurisdiction in the appellate
process. 1 17 Although there may be significant practical impediments to
enforcing a re-return order in a member state, those difficulties do not render
the appeal moot.' The subsequent task of unwinding the appellate court
rulings is one that will fall to the state court where jurisdiction would be
proper under the UCCJEA if the child is ordered to be re-returned to the
U.S." 9 Even though the Hague court proceedings would come to an end
given limited federal court jurisdiction, the underlying custodial issues
would then be ripe for state court proceedings.1 20
115 See Guide to Good Practice, Part IV, supra note 12, at 13 (explaining how appellate matters
should be handled). Neither the Convention nor ICARA prescribes the procedural aspects for time
frames of appellate review, but the Convention clearly indicates that appellate matters should also
be dealt with on an expedited basis. Id.
116 See Hon. James D. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child: A Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. 162 (2015),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Hague%20Convention%20Guide.pdf. ("[e]xpedited
procedures for briefing and handling of [return-order] appeals have become common in most
circuits.").
"' See generally Knox v. Serv. Emps. Inter. Union, Local 100, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)
(discussing the powers of the U.S. Court of Appeals).
118 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 735-36 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to U.S. Supreme
Court case Chafin v, Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013)). The Redmond court stated the following:
The Court also brushed aside concerns about practical impediments to enforcing a re-
return order. Jurisdictional continuation did not depend on the likelihood that a re-return
order would be obeyed by the parent with custody or enforced by a foreign court;
"difficulties in enforcement," the Court said, do not render a case moot. Instead, the
proper question is ifthe court issues a re-return order, and ifthe custodial parent complies
with the order, will the aggrieved parent get the child back? Absent a "law of physics
prevent[ing] [the child's] return" or a similar impediment, the answer to that question is
generally "yes."
Id.
1d 9 See id. at 736 (delegating the interpretation of appellate rulings to state courts).
120 See id. (detailing challenges brought by reversal regarding child's return and re-return and
impact of litigation). "Reversal may precipitate new legal and practical challenges surrounding [the
minor child's] re-return, and if the child is returned to [this state], he may not stay for long. id. His
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The decision to appeal is an important one, and for many litigants it
is viewed as a last chance to obtain the judicial relief they seek. Appeals are
also time consuming and expensive. In the event a return order is granted,
not only will the abducting parent be ordered to pay the petitioner's
attorney's fees and costs for trial court proceedings, they will also be ordered
to pay the petitioner's attorney fees and costs on appeal. 121
Neither the Convention nor ICARA provide authority to compel the
return of a parent, which may result in a parent and child being separated due
to a parent's immigration status, outstanding arrest warrant or criminal
charges, financial resources, or pending civil process. 122 Returning a child to
their habitual residence may mean that the child will now lose contact and
access to an abducting parent simply by virtue of the parent's inability to
return to the child's habitual residence. Economics, immigration, familial
ties, pending criminal or civil charges, and fear of reprisal may all serve as
factors diminishing the likelihood of a parent returning to the child's habitual
residence to pursue a relationship post return. 123 In some cases, a return order
will likely end the parent-child relationship for those parents that cannot or
choose not to return to the child's country of habitual residence. 124
IV. POST JUDGMENT CUSTODIAL DETERMINATIONS
Federal district courts have limited jurisdiction in Hague cases, they
can grant or deny a petition for return but they cannot enforce custody orders
or make custodial determinations regarding a child's best interests. 125 This
status will depend on the outcome of the presently pending litigation-and possible future
litigation-in the. . . state courts." Id.
121 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 26 (detailing the abducting parent's legal
fee responsibilities). Any U.S. court that orders a child's return under the Convention "shall order
the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf ofthe petitioner, including court
costs, legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of proceedings in the action, and
transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such
order would be clearly inappropriate." 22 U.S.C.S. § 9007(b)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-
193)). This is true even where the petitioner is represented by pro bono counsel. See e.g.,
Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, 549 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970-71 (N.D. Ohio 2008), and Antunez-
Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F.Supp.2d 800, 816-17 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (finding
respondent party responsible for fees even when represented by pro bono counsel).
122 See 22 U.S.C.S. § 9003(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) (explaining how to pursue
judicial proceedings under the Convention).
123 See Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 250 (Mass. 1993) (holding no requirement for
visitation of noncustodial parent). The court goes on to explain that the Convention contends that
a visitation order is meaningless given the lack of sufficient funds. Id.
124 Perez v. Rojas, unreported case on file with the author.
125 See generally Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d. 729, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
limitations of The Hague Convention). The court writes the following:
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limited authority means that at some point, The Hague litigation will end at
the district court level with a final order granting or denying the child's
return. In most cases, a child returned to their habitual residence will usually
end U.S. court involvement.1 2 6 When a return petition is denied, the child
may remain in the forum state which will presumptively exercise jurisdiction
over the child for custodial determination purposes.1 27 In the U.S., that means
the state court will have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the parties'
respective custodial, access, and visitation rights. 121 Subject matter
jurisdiction for child custody determinations over minor children in the U.S.
is dictated by the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA). 129 The UCCJEA was designed to harmonize jurisdictional
priorities for custodial determinations while also attempting to deter child
abductions in custodial disputes.130 The UCCJEA provides the jurisdictional
The Hague Convention targets international child abduction; it is not a jurisdiction-
allocation or full-faith-and-credit treaty. It does not provide a remedy for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign custody orders or procedures for vindicating a wronged
parent's custody rights more generally. Those rules are provided in the Uniform Child-
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
Id.
126 See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 168-71 (2013) (finding exception where return order
is on appeal even though the child has been returned).
127 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(b) (explaining the results of a denied
petition). "[S]ignatories to the Convention, while recognizing that 'the interests of children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to their custody' did not necessarily agree to adopt the
jurisprudence precepts of one signatory and thereby limit their own sovereignty." Caro v. Sher, 687
A.2d 354, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996). "Article (1)(b), to the contrary, makes it clear that
an objective of the Convention is 'to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States."' id. See also
Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1(b) (explaining the results of a denied petition); 22
U.S.C.S. § 9001(b)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-193) ("Congress recognizes the
international character of the Convention and the need for uniform international interpretation of
the Convention"). The exercise of state court jurisdiction will require the initiation of legal process
at the state court level to adjudicate underlying custodial claims pursuant to the UCCJEA. See Caro
v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354, 356-57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (outlining legal process through state
court).
128 See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding U.S. District Court must
address abduction claim under ICARA, but lacks authority for custody claims). See also Abduction
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 19 (emphasizing Convention decisions should not be construed as
decision on the merits for custody); 22 U.S.C.S. § 9001(b)(4) ((LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-
193) (same).
129 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997)
(replacing UCCJA as modern approach to provide uniformity).
130 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, comment, § 101, 9
U.L.A. 649 (1997) (discussing goals of UCCJEA).
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basis for establishment, modification, recognition, and enforcement of child
custodial determinations in state court proceedings."'
In most post-adjudicatory Hague Abduction case, one parent is
going to face the challenge of organizing custodial rights in a country where
they do not presently reside.132 For the abducting parent, it means going back
to the child's habitual residence to secure access rights. The practical effect
of having a judicial determination that you abducted your child may result in
such restrictive access, if any, that the parent's parental rights may be
effectively terminated due to unrealistic restraints on contact and access. 133
This will necessarily include other complicating factors such as immigration
issues, cost of international travel, visitation supervision to prevent flight,
access to justice, attorney fees and costs incurred in a foreign court system
to prosecute visitation rights and possibly criminal charges stemming from
the child's initial wrongful removal or abduction. 134 For the left-behind
parent, it means going to the country that has now assumed jurisdiction over
the child to secure access rights. 135 U.S. courts have authority to limit
international travel of children where there is sufficient evidence to support
the threat of harm or child abduction during international travel.1 36 This
131 See UNiF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, § 105(a)-(c), 9 U.L.A.
649 (1997) (detailing how to apply Act to international cases). See Arjzona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d
451, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding home state jurisdictional requirements applicable to
proceedings if home state has not declined jurisdiction).
132 Priscilla Steward, Eighth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Note: Access Rights: A
Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on The Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 336 (1997) (discussing procedure for
parent to submit evidence and receive decision while in another jurisdiction).
133 Id. at 322 (recognizing that access orders from abroad may be impracticable).
134 See Abduction Convention, supra note 2, at art. 26 (describing where to allocate costs);
PtREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 31, T 136 (discussing liability for expenses for person who
prevents access rights); Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 249-50 (Mass 1993) (ordering custodial
parent to pay travel expenses of non-custodial parent in order to facilitate visitation). See also
Steward, supra note 132, at 327 (same). See
135 See Steward, supra note 132, at 342-44 (citing England case dismissing father's access
rights after children's habitual residence changed to United Kingdom). "An application for the
procurement of access rights should not be brought under Article 21, but should be brought instead,
as an independent request upon the court of the child's habitual residence." Id. at 345.
136 In re Marriage of Katare, 283 P.3d 546, 553-54 (Wash. 2012) (determining travel
restrictions based on risk of harm and child's best interest). Risk factors include:
(1) whether there has been a prior threat of abduction; (2) whether the parent has engaged
in planning activities that could facilitate removal of the child from the jurisdiction; (3)
whether the parent has engaged in domestic violence or abuse; (4) whether the parent
has refused to cooperate with the other parent or the court; (5) whether the parent is
paranoid, delusional, or sociopathic; (6) whether the parent believes abuse has occurred;
(7) whether the parent feels alienated from the legal system; and (8) whether the parent
has a financial reason to stay in the area.
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means that post abduction Hague cases will virtually always raise a red flag
when it comes to organizing international visitation.
The left-behind parent will now face the burden of seeking judicial
relief in a foreign country, which may present significant language,
economic, legal, and cultural barriers to establishing custodial rights.' 37 Left-
behind parents are effectively placed in the position of resolving all post-trial
rights and remedies in a foreign country. The consequences may effectively
result in a de facto termination of parental rights for left-behind parents
unless there is some meaningful way to establish and enforce their custodial
rights. 13  Access cases present far more challenging dynamics than the
decision to return a child under the Convention due to the nature of
orchestrating ongoing contact and access between a child and parent who
live in two different countries. 139
"Mirror custody orders" have become popular tools to support
international visitation and access arrangements for minor children where
concerns exist that child will not be returned after being sent abroad for
Id. at 554-55. See also Marriage ofBurrill, 56 P.3d 993, 997-98 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
trial court need not wait for actual harm to accrue before imposing visitation restrictions).
137 See Steward, supra note 132, at 354 (discussing burden on left-behind parent).
The cost of re-litigating to secure access in another nation, additionally, may prove to be
enormously prohibitive to non-custodial parents. Under Article 35 of the Hague Child
Protection Convention, an access order granted in the country of the non-custodial parent
is not enough to ensure access in the new country. . . . This process may be so complex
and expensive that it may extinguish the access rights of non-custodial parents who have
already received access rights under the original custody order.
Id.
138 See generally Thomas A. Johnson, Symposium Issue Celebrating Twenty Years: The Past
and Promise ofThe 1980 Hague Convention on The CivilAspects ofInternational Child Abduction:
Articles And Remarks The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Diminishing Returns and Little to
Celebrate For Americans, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 125 (2000) (recognizing inherent unfairness
for parents).
Unfortunately, except in a few common law countries with the means and the will to
enforce visitation orders (such as the United Kingdom), refusal of a U.S. return
application by another State Party, followed by its exercise of regular custody
jurisdiction, means the total loss of the children concerned. At that point, American
parents have a clear choice: abandon their children until they are older or conduct a
rescue operation. But, in fact, it is probably already too late for the latter option in most
cases, both from a practical standpoint (civil law countries typically have outrageous
delays that assist the abducting parent in "resettling" the child and alienating.
Id. at 136.
139 See generally Steward, supra note 132, at 357-58 (concluding that without modification
Hague risks permanent alienation from parents unless access rights facilitated effectively).
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visitation.140 Mirror orders in the U.S. are anticipated through the UCCJEA
process of registering foreign custody orders. Those orders, viewed through
the lens of comity, must comply with substantive and procedural Due
Process rights to be enforceable in the U.S. 41 However, once a foreign child
custody order is properly registered in a U.S. state court, that order becomes
enforceable as any other U.S. child custody determination. 14 2 While there
may be simultaneous proceedings pending in different forums that involve
the same child, the UCCJEA is designed to identify a singular forum as
the exclusive source of jurisdiction over the child.143 Once that forum is
identified, that forum will generally have exclusive ongoing jurisdiction over
the child.1" The practical effect of registering a mirror child custody order
is to recognize the child's home state as having the exclusive jurisdiction to
modify the order thus preventing a modification of the order by any court.145
140 See Linda D. E1rod, National Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws:
Drafting Committee on Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act, 2007 41 A.B.A. FAM. L.Q. 23,
49-50 (2007) (advising obtainment of mirror order requiring the respondent to obtain a custody
order from country).
141 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895) ("[Jludgments rendered [in a] foreign
country... are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but
are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs' claim.").
142 See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act § 105, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997)
(explaining significance ofregistering child custody orders in a United States state court). See also
Zadora M. Hightower, Caught in the Middle: The Need for Uniformity in International Child
Custody Dispute Cases, 22 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REv. 637, 657 (2014) (explaining exclusivity of
jurisdiction).
In regard to non-signatories of the Hague Convention, the comment to Section 105
explains that courts are to consider only the non-signatory state's child custody laws,
rather than the non-signatory state's legal system as a whole. The comment does not
specifically state which child custody related laws would violate the fundamental
principles of human rights, however, the comment to Section 105 does clarifies that
Section 105(c) should only be utilized in "the most egregious cases."
Id. See also Dyce v. Christie, 17 So. 3d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding foreign country's
child custody law did not violate fundamental human rights). The foreign country's child custody
laws did not violate fundamental principles of human rights, as necessary to warrant a refusal to
enforce a child custody judgment in Florida under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, despite father's contention that foreign court failed to apply the principle of
considering the best interests of the child. Id. The foreign law recognized the principle of
considering the child's best interest, regardless of whether foreign court correctly applied the
principle. Id.
143 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 129, §
105(a)-(c) (treating foreign nations as U.S. states for all purposes of the Act).
144 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 129, §201
(discussing exclusive jurisdiction over the child).
145 See generally Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Summary, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Child%20Custody/o20Jurisdiction%20and
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Even in emergency situations, the UCCJEA provides only a limited basis for
the court to enter an emergency order when the child is physically present in
the state and then to transfer the case back to the child's state of habitual
residence for any other relief.14 6 This prevents a child's home state from
losing jurisdiction over the child where the child is out of the home state for
temporary periods of visitation. Although the UCCJEA protections are clear,
consistent, and predicable in the U.S., that is generally not true when it comes
to the recognition and enforcement of child custody orders in most foreign
courts. 147
Where a foreign court lacks a uniform registry system for child
custody orders, parents contemplating sending their child abroad for
international visitation should first confirm that a U.S. custody order would
be recognized and enforced, but not modified in the foreign jurisdiction. 148
Here, details matter. The U.S. child custody order would generally have to
be presented in advance to a court of competent jurisdiction in the foreign
country for review to determine if each of the provisions in the order would
be recognized and enforced as written. 149 Because domestic law will most
likely vary from country to country, it's critically important to determine if
the order will be enforced as written, harmonious with foreign law, and if
the order would be modifiable in the foreign country.`0 Where the language
is not harmonious or unenforceable, there may be an opportunity to amend
the language of the order to make it enforceable in the foreign country. The
least desirable outcome would be to first send the child abroad for visitation
and then realize the U.S. order would not be enforceable or is subject to
modification in the foreign country.
%20Enforcement/o20Act (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (recognizing exclusivity of child's home
state).
146 See generally David A. Blumberg, The Unform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act: A Focused Introduction (2016), https://www.uccjea.net/Lecture-Outline-
UCCJEA-Intro.pdf. (detailing limited basis under UCCJEA to transfer children from present state
to habitual residence).
147 Id. (explaining UCCJEA protections)
148 See Smita Aiyar, Comment, International Child Abductions Involving Non-Hague
Convention States: The Need for A Uniform Approach, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 277, 298-302
(2007) (discussing the complexity of dealing with non-Hague countries). See also Ericka A.
Schnitzer-Reese, Note & Comment, International Child Abduction to Non-Hague Convention
Countries: The Need for an International Family Court, 2 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 7 (2004)
(harping need for International Family Court given potential for re-abduction when children visit
non-Hague countries).
19 See generally Blumberg, supra note 146 (explaining significance of U.S. child custody
orders in foreign jurisdictions).
150 See Johnson, supra note 138, at 156-57 (emphasizing no reciprocity between foreign court
orders and mirror orders from states without enforcement mechanisms).
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The U.S. State Department produces an annual country compliance
report on The Hague Abduction Convention providing detailed information
on member state compliance with treaty obligations. "5 The Department's
analysis of compliance with the Convention is largely based on the standards
and practices outlined in the Permanent Bureau of The Hague Conference on
Private International Law's Guide to Good Practice. 15 2 The information
provided by the Department can help parents appreciate individual country
compliance records as determined by the U.S. State Department.153 This
information may be invaluable to parents considering the challenge of
orchestrating international visitation arrangements in signatory countries.
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. federal district court judges have endeavored to remain faithful
to the Hague Abduction Convention mandate requiring prompt resolution of
international child abduction cases submitted to federal court jurisdiction for
resolution. That commitment is reflected in trial court proceedings fashioned
to expedite resolution of abduction cases even at the expense of procedural
protections otherwise applicable through the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Consistent with the command of ICARA, expedient resolution of
abduction cases demands a streamlined approach which may run roughshod
on the timeframes set forth in the procedural aspects of post-trial remedies
otherwise designed to challenge the propriety of trial court determinations.
A parent challenging the propriety of a return order must be prepared to
151 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ANNUAL
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION (2017),
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/NEWIPCAAssets/pdfs/2017%20ICAPRA%20Report/`20-
%20Final%20(1).pdf [hereinafter 2017 ANNUAL REPORT] (detailing compliance with the Hague
Abduction Convention).
152 See Publications, HCCH (last visted Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.hech.net/en/publications-
and-studies/publications2(explaining standards of Permanent Bureau of The Hague Conference on
Private International Law's Guide to Good Practice).
153 See generally 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 9 (explaining significance of
different country compliance records).
Argentina - Country Summary: The United States and Argentina have been partners
under The Hague Abduction Convention since 1991. In 2016, Argentina demonstrated
a pattern of noncompliance when judicial and law enforcement authorities in Argentina
persistently failed to implement and abide by the provisions of The Hague Abduction
Convention. As a result of this failure, 100 percent of requests for the return of abducted
children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On
average, these cases were unresolved for 69 months. Argentina has been cited as non-
compliant since 2014.
Id.
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immediately respond post judgment if their strategy includes preventing the
child's removal while appellate remedies are sought. There may be few post-
trial procedural remedies to address an adverse ruling on a return petition.
But, an order staying enforcement of the return order must be considered.
While the stay will be the exception in Hague litigation, there are few
palatable remedies available - if any at all. Even where a stay is not issued,
appellate remedies will still exist even though it seems highly unlikely those
remedies would deliver practical results to the extent a child would be re-
returned to the U.S. pursuant to a favorable appellate outcome. For every
child that is subject to a return order, and every child that is not ordered to
be returned, there will be one parent now faced with the daunting task of
establishing and enforcing custodial rights to their child who is now subject
to jurisdiction in a country where the parent does not reside. Although there
may be substantial impediments to organizing and enforcing access rights,
those rights are a legitimate priority within the objects of the Convention
even if they present incredibly difficult legal and practical impediments to
maintain the parent-child relationship in post judgment Hague Abduction
proceedings.
264
